大股东股权质押与掏空
-基于ST保千里案例分析
摘要
2014-2015的牛市带动了股权质押的飞速发展。股价高涨使得其质押价值迅速提升，股权质押可以为大股东获得大量的流动资金。股权质押的特点是既能为股权持有人获得质押资金，又不会稀释其对公司的控制权，而且无论是流通股，还是限售股都可以质押，因而这一融资形式大受青睐。然而股权质押在给大股东带来融资便利的同时，也给一些上市公司管理带来了巨大影响。股权质押以后，大股东保留了对上市公司的控制权，但其现金流权却随着质押让渡到了质押方，导致大股东的控制权与现金流权高度分离，这又加剧了大股东对中小股东的代理问题。一旦大股东的权力得不到有效的约束，大股东为了自身的利益而掏空上市公司，牺牲的必然是中小股东的利益的利益。
保千里于2015年4月借壳上市，正赶上牛市的高峰。公司于2015-2017期间大举对外扩张，几乎涉足所有热门科技概念。保千里股价最高时超过28元每股，市值最高超600亿。在表面上看起来蓬勃发展的这段时间里，大股东质押了几乎所有的股票，并对上市公司进行掏空。在掏空事件曝光以后，保千里股价连续29个交易日跌停，最终维持在每股1元左右，公司经营基本停滞。本文首先对股权质押和大股东掏空的相关文献进行梳理，然后以保千里为例，详细分析了保千里大股东股权质押的历史过程，并深入研究股权质押后大股东对上市公司的系列掏空行为以及所带来的影响，最后对事件的根源进行总结并提出建议。
关键字：股权质押,掏空,大股东
Equity Pledge and Tunneling of Controlling Shareholder
-A Case Study based on ST Protruly
Abstract
The bull market of 2014-2015 drove the rapid development of Equity Pledge.The rising stock price makes the value of the pledge increase rapidly.Equity pledge can not only obtain the pledged capital for the Shareholders, but also not dilute their control of the company. Moreover, both outstanding shares and restricted shares can be pledged, as a result this form of financing is greatly favored. However, while equity pledge brings financing convenience to controlling shareholders, it also brings huge influence to the management of some listed companies. After equity pledge, controlling shareholders retain the right of control over listed companies, but their cash flow rights are transferred to the pledgor along with the pledge, resulting in a high degree of separation between the control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, which aggravates the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Once the power of the controlling shareholders is not effectively restrained, the controlling shareholders might tunnel the listed company for their own interests, and the interests of the minority shareholders will be sacrificed.
Protruly, which went public through a backdoor listing in April 2015, was at the height of the bull market. The company expanded aggressively from 2015 to 2017, investing in almost every hot technology concept. At its peak, Protruly’s share price exceeded 28 yuan per share and its market value topped 60 billion yuan. During this seemingly booming period, controlling shareholder pledged nearly all its shares and tunneled the listed company. After the tunneling behavior was exposed, Protruly’s stock price limited down for 29 consecutive transaction days, and finally maintained around 1 yuan per share, and the company's operation basically closed down. This paper, firstly, sorts out the literature of the equity pledge and tunneling of controlling shareholders, and then based on Protruly Case, analyze of the equity pledge history of Protruly controlling shareholders in details, and further study tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders after equity pledge as well as the impact on the listed company, finally the root of events was summarized and suggestions are put forward.
目录
摘要
Abstract
目录
第1章 绪论
1.1 研究背景
1.2 研究内容
1.3 研究思路和方法
1.4 研究贡献
1.5 本章小结
第2章 文献综述
2.1 股权质押
2.2 掏空
2.3 本章小结
第3章 案例背景
3.1 保千里简介
3.2 保千里2015-2018股权结构
3.3 保千里2015-2018业绩概况
3.4 本章小结
第4章 案例分析
4.1 保千里大股东股权质押情况
4.2 保千里大股东的掏空行为
4.3 保千里大股东掏空的后果
4.4 保千里大股东掏空的根源分析
4.5 管理建议
4.6 本章小结
第5章 结论和展望
5.1 结论
5.2 展望
参考文献
