中小企业融资外文翻译及原文-毕业作品网站

The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.

For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.

In the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.

The first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.

The first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.

The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.

Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.

The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .

The basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.

But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.

The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.

If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.

In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.

Banks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.

The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.

After other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.

Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.

Currently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.

We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.

中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。根据啄食理论，企业在融资时，会优先选择成本最低的融资方式；而根据静态权衡理论，企业在进行融资时，各种资金来源的边际成本都是相同的；再者，根据优序融资理论，企业进行融资时要结合企业自身具体情况，是考虑多重因素下的优序融资。在本文中，我们认为，以上这些理论都忽略了一点，那就是边际成本的确定主要依赖于融资资金的使用，以及资产负债表中资产方作为融资来源的重要影响作用。一个来自葡萄牙中小企业的数据分析证实，企业资产负债表资产方对于融资方式的选择有着重要的影响，而这是静态权衡理论和优序融资理论所不能接受的。

中小企业的融资主要来源于股权（内部融资），商业信用，银行信贷和其他债务。融资方式的选择取决于资金成本，而资金成本又是由信息不对称成本和基于无债务负担情况下的预期成本决定的。信息不对称成本主要是为了支持管理决策而收集和分析信息所产生的费用，无债预期成本主要产生于企业为收回债务而收集和出售抵押品时的费用。由于中小企业的管理层和股东往往是同一个人，股权和内部产生的资金没有信息不对称成本，因此股权融资是成本最低的融资渠道。

在前面的论述中，我们曾建议，葡萄牙的中小企业多采用内部资金、廉价贸易信贷、中长期银行信贷、高价贸易信贷和其他贷款进行融资。接下来，我们将对以上各种类型的融资动机进行讨论。

首先，我们将讨论的是贸易信贷。贸易信贷很有意思，因为它们代表的非金融企业与金融中介机构在提供金融服务方面的竞争。这一领域内的早期研究关注于贸易信贷同的信贷渠道的作用（或所谓的“梅尔策”影响）之间的关系，以及同货币政策的效率之间的关系。其基本思想是，企业尤其是大型知名企业，同的面临财务困境小企业，直接在金融市场达成贸易信贷的交易。在最近的研究中，将对贸易信贷的利用分为战略动机和财务动机。

第一种理论是关于公司产品的信息不对称。贸易信贷是由卖方提供，使买方可以在付款前确认产品的数量和质量。通过提供贸易融资，供应商想证明的是，他们可以为买家提供优质的产品。由于中小企业在一般情况下信誉不高，因此这些企业迫于无奈，往往使用贸易信贷的方式以证明其产品质量。由于产品的信息不对称，买方对供应商的资料很少，或者供应商产品的情况复杂，质量难以鉴定，因此贸易信贷被中小企业广泛使用。

第二个战略动机是定价。以优惠条件提供贸易融资，其作用同商品降价类似。因此，企业可以利用贸易信贷，间接的降低产品价格或作为不同买家之间的价格歧视工具，以促进销售。相比于风险借款而言，贸易信贷是有利的，因为这种替代性融资的有着一个更为优惠的融资利率。因此，贸易信贷可以被用来作为直接的价格歧视的工具，或者作为低信誉借款人的间接工具（如果所有的买家提供相同的条件）。

贸易信贷也可以帮助供应商发展与买家的长期合作关系。这往往体现在买方出现暂时财务困难的情况下，供应商要允许其延长付款期。同金融机构相比，供应商具有更好的的行业知识，因此能够更好地判断买方是面临暂时的困难还是存在一个长期性的问题。

没有严格意义上的战略动机，最终动机都是基于交易成本。贸易信贷作为进行交易有效方式，可以明确地区分货物交割和帐款支付。从最基本的方面讲，卡车司机运送货物，不必再四处找相关负责人支付帐单，买方还可以节约交易成本所需的现金。

这种观点的基本内容是，企业与金融机构在为其他公司提供信贷业务上进行竞争。金融机构的传统观点是，他们在向企业提供信用时的主要问题是信息不对称。金融机构在收集和分析来自企业，特别是受制与信息不对称影响的中小型企业的信息时，具有一定优势。这种优势的确立，关键在于银行与目标企业之间存在支付功能的密切关系，金融机构可以通过监测目标企业的帐目现金流入和流出来获取相关信息。

但随着贸易信贷逐渐流行，非金融企业同金融机构在解决这些问题及拓展信贷渠道方面，展开了激烈的竞争。非金融机构如何能够在这个市场进行竞争？彼得森和拉詹（1997）就此简要讨论几种方式，并提出供应商对金融机构可能存在的优势。相比于金融机构，供应商同借款人之间有着更加密切的工作关系和更加频繁的沟通交流。供应商和贷款人之间所达成订单的时间及规模，提供借款人有关业务情况的信息，需要注意的是，此信息是先提供给供应商的，金融机构必须等待与订单相关的现金流产生后，才能获取相关的业务信息。还有早期付款折扣的提供，使供应商及早的同借款人达成了一种信用关系，因此供应商能够比金融机构更快，更方便地取得相关业务信息

供应商在收款方面也存在一定的优势。如果供应商至少能在一个地方形成供货的垄断，那么他们就能对客户公司支付账款形成强有力的督促。这种督促作用很明显，特别是当借款人的业务只占供应商业务中的很小一部分时。在相同的情况下，相比于金融机构，供应商对借款人货物的扣留能对借款人产生更大的影响，以及通过其销售网络，以更高的价格出售商品和更的速度回收账款。当然这些优势都是要建立在供应商对借款人所提供货物和借款的重要性的基础之上。

鉴于信息不对称是产生贸易信贷的因素之一，那么客户企业就要明白，供应商在授予他们贸易信贷的同时，也能够为自己争取到更多的银行信贷。银行业会把供应商的贸易信贷质量的优劣，作为对他们授信的重要参考。

总而言之，由于对客户企业及其所属行业的了解毕竟还存在欠缺，贸易信贷的提供者同借款人之间的信息不对称程度还比较低。贸易信贷发展至今，经验告诉我们贸易信贷的实施主要是基于企业商誉风险和产品销售成本。由于以货物供应作为担保，使企业的贸易信贷额度始终控制的货物总价值之内。

相比于贸易信贷的提供者，银行能够获取的信息更少，获取信息的成本也更高。在使用货物作为抵押时，贸易信贷提供者比银行具有优势；然而，受交易的数量和规模的影响，银行往往以诸如建筑、机械设备等大宗资产作为抵押，在这个方面反而是银行更具优势。因此，银行更倾向于以有形资产作为信贷担保，而且由于信息不对称，他们也不愿意向信息不透明的公司，如增长迅速的小企业，发放贷款，相对的银行更愿意提供的是有形资产作为担保的长期贷款。在接下来基于有形资产和信用风险变量的实证研究中，我们将要重点阐述银行长期贷款的授予和授予额度是如何取决于作为担保的有形资产的价值的。

银行在收集和评价债务人应收账款方面的相对优势，是发放短期银行贷款的基础。当然现金及其等价物也可以用作担保，但由于存在现金流动和市场安全方面的风险，相比于其他信贷提供者，银行在收集和研究这些信息并没有任何优势。在存货抵押方面，情况也是如此。因此，我们在解释银行短期信贷行为时，将会把债务人的数量作为主要的变量因素来研究。

当其他融资手段都丧失作用时，企业还可以利用拖延支付账款的贸易信贷方式。然而，采用此种方式的成本是非常高的，因为它意味着企业放弃了现金折扣，甚至会招致罚金。使用这种贸易信贷会降低企业的信誉，可能会使企业以后很难获取同类的信贷。当然，成本的高低取决于企业所对应的供应商数量：如果只有一个供应商，那么这种成本还是相当高的；如果供应商有多个，那么这种成本也不算很高。

其他种类的信贷如信用卡债务、汽车贷款等，其成本比银行贷款还要高，同样客户财务表现的优劣，也是决定其能否获取这些信贷的主要因素。由于我们对此类贷款的关注较少，获取的信息不够充分，在这里就不多作论述。

目前关于资本结构的理论主要有两种。第一种是优序融资理论，即企业要首先选择成本最低的融资来源，其次是成本较低的，然后以此类推。基于信息不对称而进行的逆向选择，是产生资金成本差异的主要原因。第二种是权衡理论，即企业债务增加的前提是其能带来更多的利润增加。债务的好处在于它可以作为企业的“抵税盾牌”、“积极代理成本”以及“负代理成本”。这些理论的论述，对于企业资产负债表资产方的组成也有着重要影响。由此得出的结论是，由于企业在融资中所采用的债务类型不同，企业资产负债表的资产方组成对负债方组成也有着重要影响，或者说资金的用途很大程度上决定着企业的融资类型。

我们可以进一步认为，这是信息不对称和抵押品因素在资产负债表中资产和负债双方关系的反映。这种认知对于廉价贸易信贷和长期银行信贷来讲是合理的，但却不能应用在短期银行贷款上。